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The Extraterritorial Application of
Antitrust Laws: A Postscript on
Hartford Fire Insurance Co.
v. California
ROGER P. ALFORD*
Last year in the pages of this journal I published an article com-
paring the United States and the European Union (E.U.)
approaches to the extraterritorial application of antitrust laws.1 In
discussing the U.S. approach, I predicted that "while the jurisdic-
tional rule of reason has its weaknesses, it will remain a lasting fix-
ture on the legal landscape precisely because it represents the only
genuine, though inexact, attempt by courts to fashion a jurisdic-
tional test which incorporates the legitimate sovereignty interests
of foreign nations."2 Thus, it was with disappointment that I, along
with other proponents of a jurisdictional rule of reason, received
the Supreme Court's decision in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
* New York University, J.D.; Edinburgh University, LLM. The author is Legal
Assistant to the Honorable Richard C. Allison, Iran-United States Claims Tibunal, The
Hague, The Netherlands.
1. Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: The United
States and European Community Approaches, 33 Va. J. Int'l L 1 (1992).
2. Id. at 16. For a discussion of the evolution of the United States approach to the
extraterritorial application of antitrust laws, an approach which previously incorporated
the jurisdictional rule of reason, see id. at 6-27; infra notes 4-18 and accompanying text.
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California,3 a case which narrowly construes international comity
and eschews the balancing of foreign sovereignty interests save
perhaps in instances of conflicting state commands.
Confident that there will be numerous articles sedulously analyz-
ing this decision, I intend here simply to offer a brief critique and
comparison of the United States and European Union approaches
to the extraterritorial application of antitrust laws now that Hart-
ford Fire is the law of the land in the United States. Stated posi-
tively, the thesis of this Postscript is that there is now a
convergence of views between the United States and European
Union as to whether international comity may be invoked to
restrain the unfettered extraterritorial application of antitrust laws.
Stated negatively, this Postscript argues that the United States has
followed the European Union in adopting an approach that fails to
accord due respect to legitimate foreign sovereignty interests
except in the (unusual) instance of a "true conflict" between for-
eign and domestic laws.
I. THE UNITED STATES APPROACH PRIOR TO HARTFORD FIRE
As discussed in my previous article,4 the United States has long
asserted its right to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over foreign
defendants whose anticompetitive activities have the intended
effect of causing a substantially adverse impact on U.S. commerce.5
As Judge Learned Hand wrote in Alcoa, "any state may impose
liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct
outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which
the state reprehends. ' '6 The United States Supreme Court later
adopted this approach,7 and the "effects doctrine," as it is known,
3. 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
4. Alford, supra note 1, at 6-27.
5. The seminal decision in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945), began this trend.
6. Id. at 443.
7. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,582 n.6 (1986) ("The
Sherman Act does reach conduct outside our borders, but only when the conduct has an
effect on American commerce."); cf. Cont. Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370
U.S. 690, 704 (1962) ("A conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign
commerce of the United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because
part of the conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries."); Steele v. Bulova Watch
Co., 344 U.S. 280, 288 (1952) (In a trademark infringement case, there is no "blanket
immunity on trade practices which radiate unlawful consequences here, merely because
they were initiated or consummated outside the territorial limits of the United States.
Unlawful effects in this country ... are often decisive.").
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is now the primary basis for prescriptive jurisdiction by U.S. courts
over foreign antitrust defendants.
While the effects doctrine gained acceptance in the United
States, it aroused criticism abroad for its failure to respect princi-
ples of international comity. Some governments charged that the
extraterritorial application of antitrust laws violates public interna-
tional law, and objected to U.S. jurisdictional assertions on those
grounds.8 Several states retaliated against this perceived encroach-
ment by adopting "blocking statutes" limiting the extraterritorial
reach of U.S. antitrust laws?
In response to these protests, several of the federal circuits
sought to temper the harsh results of Alcoa by balancing the inter-
ests of the United States in regulating anticompetitive activity
against the legitimate sovereignty interests of other nations. As
propounded by the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of America,10 this balancing approach attempts to determine
"whether the interests of, and links to, the United States ... are
sufficiently strong, vis-h-vis those of other nations, to justify an
assertion of extraterritorial authority."" Under this so-called
"jurisdictional rule of reason," whether the exercise of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction is considered reasonable must be determined by
evaluating several factors, including (1) the degree of conflict with
foreign law or policy, (2) the nationality of the parties, (3) the rela-
tive importance of the alleged violation in the United States com-
pared to that abroad, (4) the availability of a remedy abroad, (5)
the existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and
its foreseeability, (6) the possible effect upon foreign relations if
the court exercises jurisdiction and grants relief, (7) whether a
party will be forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be
under conflicting requirements, (8) whether the court can make its
order effective, (9) whether an order for relief would be acceptable
in this country if made by the foreign nation under similar circum-
8. See Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 Law
& Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1, 32-33 (1992).
9. See, e.g., Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29 (1985) (Can.); Law
No. 80-538, J.O. 1797 (1980), amending Law No. 68-678, J.O. 1799 (1968) (France);
Protection of Trading Interests Act, ch. 11 (1980) (U.K.); see also Alford, supra note 1, at
9-10; P.C.F. Pettit & CJ.D. Styles, The International Response to the Extraterritorial
Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. Law. 697, 707-14 (1982) (describing
statutes of various nations).
10. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
11. Id. at 613.
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stances, and (10) whether a treaty with the affected nation has
addressed the issue.
12
The jurisdictional rule of reason received widespread support
and was adopted by several of the federal courts of appeals. 3 The
relative importance of the various comity concerns, and the criteria
for applying them, however, lacked precise definition and evoked
considerable debate and disagreement among the circuits.'4 The
rule of reason also came under fire because U.S. courts almost
invariably found the balance tipped in favor of jurisdiction-lend-
ing credibility to the charge that U.S. courts weighing nebulous cri-
teria will simply assert the primacy of U.S. interests under the guise
of the neutral rule of reason.' 5
Because courts were unable to agree on the appropriate extra-
territorial reach of the U.S. antitrust laws, Congress in 1982
enacted the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
(FTAIA). 6 Under the FTAIA, the Sherman Act may be applied
extraterritorially to conduct that has a "direct, substantial, and rea-
sonably foreseeable effect" on domestic or import commerce, or
12. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir.
1979) (citations omitted); see also "limberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597
(9th Cir. 1976) (providing a shorter list of factors to be considered). This approach is also
reflected in Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 403
(1987 & Supp. 1993) [hereinafter Restatement (Third)], which also provides a number of
factors for determining whether a court's exercise of jurisdiction is "unreasonable."
13. See, e.g., Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884-85 (5th Cir.
1982), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983), prior holding reaffirmed 704 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1983)
(applying interest balancing to conclude that the District Court erred in dismissing the
suit); Montreal Trading, Ltd. v. Amax Indus., Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869-70 (10th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982) (adopting and following the Timberlane analysis). But
see Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 950-52 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (rejecting balancing approach because courts are ill-equipped to determine whether
vital national interests of United States or those of other nations should predominate).
14. Alford, supra note 1, at 26-27.
15. See, e.g., In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 931-34 (9th Cir. 1991) (employing
the balancing test to hold that international comity does not require U.S. courts to abstain
from exercising jurisdiction over British reinsurers in an antitrust case), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part sub nom. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993); Montreal
Trading, 661 F.2d at 869-70 (dismissing a suit because any effects on U.S. commerce were
"insubstantial" and "speculative," and were outweighed by comity concerns); Dominicus
Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(acknowledging a balancing test as the "proper test," but holding that the record was
insufficient to allow a review of the relevant factors); see also Harold G. Maier, Interest
Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 Am. J. Comp. L. 579, 589-90 (1983)
(asserting that courts applying the balancing test usually ignore or "give short shrift" to
foreign national interests).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6(a), 45(a)(3) (1988). For a discussion of the coverage of the FTAIA,
see Alford, supra note 1, at 16-19.
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on export commerce undertaken by domestic concerns.17 Courts,
however, did not interpret this codification of the effects doctrine
as curtailing their ability to apply principles of international com-
ity. Even after the enactment of the FTAIA, therefore, courts con-
tinued to apply the jurisdictional rule of reason in addition to
determining whether jurisdiction was permissible under the
"direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" effects test.'8
Thus, prior to Hartford Fire there was, in effect, a two-tiered test
for the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws. First, the
FTAIA provided a statutory standard, based on the degree of
impact on U.S. commerce, for determining when jurisdiction could
be asserted by U.S. courts. Second, the common law, in light of
international comity concerns, set the rule of reason as the measure
of when jurisdiction should be exercised over foreign defendants.
The loosely defined jurisdictional rule of reason was thus grafted
by the courts onto the statutory framework. Confusion resulting
from this hybrid analysis left the extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust laws in need of clarification.
H. TiH HARTFORD FIRE APPROACH
In Hartford Fire, nineteen U.S. states and numerous private
plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, a conspiracy among certain London
reinsurers to coerce primary insurers in the United States to offer
commercial general liability insurance coverage to consumers only
if certain changes advantageous to the reinsurers were made in the
insurance forms. The plaintiffs claimed that failure to make such
17. 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1988).
18. See, e.g., McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802,813-15,814 n.8 (9th Cir. 1988)
(applying 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1988), but stating that "in passing the [FTAIA], Congress did
not change the ability of the courts to exercise principles of international comity"); O.N.E.
Shipping, Ltd. v. Flora Mercante Grancolombina, S.A., 830 F.2d 449,451-54 (2d Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 923 (1988) (dismissing antitrust case under the act of state doctrine);
Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. BP N. Am. Petroleum, 738 F. Supp. 1472, 1477-78 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (citing and applying the Tunberlane factors). In addition, the Justice Department
continues to perform a comity analysis in its own enforcement proceedings after it
determines that jurisdiction has been established. See United States Department of Justice
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations. Part I, § 5, reprinted in 55
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391, at S-22 to S-23 (Spec. Supp. 1988); see also
United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 731 F. Supp. 3, 6 n.5 (D.D.C. 1990). However, the
degree of deference given to comity in such enforcement proceedings appears limited.
Interview with Anne Y. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division. U.S.
Department of Justice, 8 Antitrust 8, 9 (1993) ("I cannot define with precision when we
would not file a case solely because of comity considerations. I would hope that where
conduct is aimed at, and has a substantial impact in, the United States, only in the most
unusual situations would we actually stay enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws.").
1993]
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changes would result in the reinsurers' boycotting those insurance
forms and withholding reinsurance coverage from the primary
insurers, a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.19
The District Court dismissed the claims against the foreign
defendants, invoking international comity and applying the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Timberlane.20  The Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding that under its Timberlane balancing approach, the principle
of international comity was no bar to exercising jurisdiction.21
While recognizing that the application of U.S. antitrust laws to the
London reinsurers would lead to significant conflict with English
law and policy, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that
under its Timberlane analysis other factors, including the London
reinsurers' express purpose to affect United States commerce and
the substantial nature of the effect produced, outweighed the con-
flict and required the exercise of jurisdiction.22
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider, inter alia,
"whether certain claims against the London reinsurers should have
been dismissed as improper applications of the Sherman Act to
foreign conduct." 3 In announcing its 5-4 decision,24 the Court
noted at the outset that the District Court undoubtedly had juris-
diction over these claims under the effects doctrine, as was appar-
ently conceded by the London reinsurers.25 As the Court noted,
"it is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to for-
eign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce
some substantial effect in the United States. '26 Applying the
effects doctrine, the Court ruled that the jurisdictional requirement
was satisfied; the reinsurers allegedly conspired to affect the mar-
19. Hartford Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2897-99.
20. In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464, 487-90 (N.D. Cal. 1989), rev'd, 938 F.2d
919 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,
113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
21. In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 931-34 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
22. In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 933-34.
23. Hartford Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2908.
24. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court on this issue, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens. Id. at 2908-11. Justice
Scalia filed a dissenting opinion on the issue, in which Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Thomas joined. Id. at 2917-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25. See id. at 2910 n.24.
26. Id. at 2909 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
582 n.6 (1986)); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416,444 (2d Cir.
1945); Restatement (Third), supra note 12, § 415 and reporters' note 3 (1987).
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ket for insurance in the United States, and their conduct in fact
produced a substantial effect.
As for the comity question, the Court noted that when Congress
enacted the FrAIA, it expressed no view on the question of
whether a court should ever decline to exercise jurisdiction on
grounds of international comity. The Court, too, avoided that
question, "for even assuming that in a proper case a court may
decline to exercise Sherman Act jurisdiction over foreign conduct
... international comity would not counsel against exercising juris-
diction in the circumstances alleged here."27
Under the Court's international comity analysis, "the only sub-
stantial question in this case is whether 'there is in fact a true con-
flict between domestic and foreign law.' " 28 The London
reinsurers, as well as the British government appearing as amicus
curiae, asserted that applying the Sherman Act to the London rein-
surers' conduct would conflict significantly with British law, under
which Parliament has established a comprehensive regulatory
regime for the London reinsurance market. The Court, however,
held that merely to assert that the reinsurers' conduct was consis-
tent with British law and policy
is not to state a conflict. "[T]he fact that conduct is lawful
in the state in which it took place will not, of itself, bar
application of the United States antitrust laws," even
where the foreign state has a strong policy to permit or
encourage such conduct.... No conflict exists, for these
purposes, "where a person subject to regulation by two
states can comply with the laws of both."29
Because the London reinsurers did not argue that British law
required them to act in some fashion prohibited by United States
law, or claim that their compliance with the laws of both countries
was otherwise impossible, the Court found no conflict with British
law.
As for other international comity considerations, the Court held
that it had "no need in this case to address other considerations
that might inform a decision to refrain from the exercise of jurisdic-
27. Hartford Fire, 113 S. CL at 2910.
28. Id. (quoting Socint6 Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United States Dist.
Court, 482 U.S. 522,555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)). For
a discussion of the majority opinion in Arospatiale, see infra notes 46-49 and
accompanying text.
29. Id. at 2910 (quoting Restatement (Third), supra note 12, § 415 cnt. j, § 403 cmt. e).
1993]
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tion on grounds of international comity. °30 Accordingly, it held
that "the principle of international comity does not preclude Dis-
trict Court jurisdiction over the foreign conduct alleged.
'31
III. CRMiQUE
The United States approach as articulated in Hartford Fire
sharply diverges from the previous state of the law. Stated suc-
cinctly, Hartford Fire holds (1) that the Sherman Act applies to
foreign conduct intended to produce, and in fact producing, some
substantial effect in the United States, and (2) that principles of
international comity may preclude a court from exercising jurisdic-
tion in such a case, if at all, only where the laws of a foreign sover-
eign and the commands of the Sherman Act diverge beyond the
point of reconciliation.
The Court's holding raises several important issues. First, the
Supreme Court has unequivocally affirmed the effects doctrine;
indeed, Hartford Fire represents one of the clearest endorsements
ever by the Supreme Court of the propriety of its use as a basis for
prescriptive jurisdiction. The legal source of the holding, however,
remains somewhat obscure. Although alluding to the FTAIA else-
where, the Court surprisingly did not utilize the FTAIA's "direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" language, despite the fact
that the FTAIA arguably governed. 32 The Court's test for Sher-
man Act applicability, referring to foreign "conduct that was meant
to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the
United States, 33 departs from the statutory language to encom-
pass conduct whose effects are intended and substantial, even if not
direct or reasonably foreseeable.
Second, the Court declined to speak to the weight of comity con-
siderations in cases covered by the Sherman Act. A court must
30. Id. at 2911.
31. Id. at 2895.
32. The Court ruled that the London reinsurers engaged in conduct affecting the United
States market for insurance, and therefore domestic commerce, see id. at 2909, but did not
decide how the FrAIA would apply in the case. The Court did note, however, that,
assuming the standard of the FTAIA affected the case, and assuming that the standard
announced a departure from law in effect prior to the statute, the conduct alleged would
satisfy the FTAIA's effects test. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. Moreover,
in asking whether Congress, in enacting the FTAIA, intended to permit a court to decline
jurisdiction on grounds of international comity, the Court noted that Congress had been
silent on the issue. Hartford Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2910; see Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at
932.
33. Hartford Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2909.
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first determine whether it has statutory jurisdiction over the Sher-
man Act claims,M and only then consider whether to "decline to
exercise such jurisdiction on grounds of international comity" if
"'there is in fact a true conflict between domestic and foreign
law.' ,,35 The Court denied such a conflict and held that interna-
tional comity did not "counsel against exercising jurisdiction in the
circumstances alleged here. '36 The Court thus adhered to a bifur-
cated analysis, inquiring first into statutory jurisdiction and then
into considerations of comity (even if only to foreclose the ques-
tion in the instant case).
Thus, lower courts addressing this issue should continue to util-
ize a two-tiered approach, considering both statutory jurisdiction
and considerations of comity. Where international comity, as
defined by the Court, would not counsel against exercising jurisdic-
tion, Hartford Fire requires the court to exercise jurisdiction when-
ever the statutory jurisdictional requirements obtain. However, in
instances presenting a "true conflict," Hartford Fire provides little
guidance as to how much deference, if any, should be accorded to
the principle of international comity.
37
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Hartford Fire is that the
Court interpreted international comity quite narrowly, finding that
the "only substantial question" to consider in introducing comity
considerations is whether "'there is in fact a true conflict between
domestic and foreign law.' ",38 This analysis requires a determina-
34. Id. at 2909.
35. Id. at 2910. In his dissent, Justice Scalia strongly criticized the Court's approach in
this regard. "It is evident from what I have said that the Court's comity analysis, which
proceeds as though the issue is whether the courts should 'decline to exercise ...
jurisdiction,' rather than whether the Sherman Act covers this conduct, is simply
misdirected." Id. at 2921 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
36. Id. at 2910.
37. This is not to say that the Court should have included such dicta, but only that it
leaves the question unanswered by the Court. As a result, courts will likely rely on
previous lower court rulings concluding that, in adopting the FTAIA, "Congress did not
change the ability of the courts to exercise principles of international comity." McGlinchy
v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802,814 n.8; see also O.N.E. Shipping, Ltd. v. Flora Mercante
Grancolombina, S.A., 830 F.2d 449,451-54 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 923 (1988)
(act of state doctrine required dismissal of antitrust claim); Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena,
Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 946 n.137 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (FrAIA does not alter
"the ability of the courts to exercise comity."); Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. BP N. Am.
Petroleum, 738 F. Supp. 1472, 1477-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying the Timberlane factors).
The legislative history of the FrAIA indicates that the Act was not intended to have any
effect on a court's ability to employ the principle of international comity. H.R. Rep. No.
686,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487,2498 (FTAIA has
"no effect on the courts' ability to employ notions of comity.").
38. Hartford Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2910.
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tion by the court as to whether the court has subject-matter juris-
diction.39 Under this approach, a court arguably need not consider
any other question in assessing whether international comity might
preclude the exercise of jurisdiction. If this is the case, then no
matter how strong the defendant's connections may be to another
jurisdiction or how attenuated they may be to the United States; no
matter how important the regulation of such activity may be to the
foreign state or how insignificant it may be to the United States;
and no matter how adverse the effects may be upon foreign rela-
tions if jurisdiction is exercised, the court must exercise jurisdiction
if there is a substantial and intended 40 effect on U.S. commerce, at
least when there is no actual conflict between domestic and foreign
law. In so holding, the Supreme Court rejected the arguments of
the United States, appearing as amicus curiae, that a conflict with
foreign law may be found where "the defendants could not have
avoided engaging in the disputed conduct without frustrating
clearly articulated policies of the foreign government.
41
The Court's "true conflict" approach is also in tension with its
previous pronouncements on international comity. In its classical
definition of the doctrine,42 the Court stated that international
comity is "the recognition which one nation allows within its terri-
tory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and
to the rights of its own citizens." 43 In Lauritzen v. Larsen,44 a case
involving a personal injury claim under the Jones Act brought by a
Danish seaman against a Danish shipowner for acts occurring in
Cuban waters, the Court emphasized that the case posed a poten-
tial conflict between U.S. and Danish law. "That allowance of an
additional remedy under our Jones Act would sharply conflict with
the policy and letter of Danish law is plain. '45 Significantly, the
39. Id. at 2909 nn.22, 24.
40. Id. at 2909.
41. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 28,
Hartford Fire, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993) (No. 91-1111).
42. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
43. Id. at 164.
44. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
45. Id. at 575 (emphasis added); cf. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963) (National Labor Relations Act does not apply on
ships, flying the Honduran flag and staffed by a foreign crewmembers, owned by a foreign
subsidiary of a U.S. corporation, because Honduran law prescribed that a local union had
to represent the seamen); Cont. Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690,
704-06 (1962) (antitrust action alleging exclusion from the Canadian market allowed, as
the validity of Canadian government actions were not being questioned); Romero v. Int'l
[Vol. 34:213
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defendant in Lauritzen did not encounter a Hartford Fire "true
conflict"; i.e., the defendant was not compelled by Danish law to
take action in violation of U.S. law, nor was compliance with both
sets of laws impossible. Rather, U.S. law provided a Jones Act
remedy for "any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the
course of his employment," whereas Danish law provided a com-
prehensive, state-operated compensation system for sailors on
Danish ships.4 To avoid such a conflict, the Court reasoned that
customary international law and considerations of international
comity have "the force of law, not from extraterritorial reach of
national laws, nor from abdication of its sovereign powers by any
nation, but from acceptance by common consent of civilized com-
munities to rules designed to foster amicable and workable com-
mercial relations."47 Accordingly, the Court attempted to avoid or
resolve the "conflicts" between the competing laws and policies by
ascertaining and valuing points of contact between the transaction
and the states whose competing laws were involved.48 In so doing,
the Court held that the Jones Act did not apply.
49
Similarly, in Socigtg Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United
States District Court,50 a case involving the extraterritorial reach of
U.S. discovery laws under the Hague Evidence Convention, 51 the
Court ruled that comity required courts to balance "the respective
interests of the foreign nation and the requesting nation," scrutiniz-
ing "in each case ... the particular facts, the sovereign interests,
and the likelihood that resort [to the Hague Evidence Convention]
will prove effective."52 The Court counseled that "American
courts should therefore take care to demonstrate due respect for
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 381-84 (1959) (applying Lauritzen to hold that a
Spanish citizen could not recover in a Jones Act suit against a Spanish company for injuries
suffered in American waters).
46. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 573 n.1, 575-76. Justice Scalia cited this passage in Lauritzen
in his dissent in Hartford Fire: "The petitioners here, like the defendant in Lauritzen, were
not compelled by any foreign law to take their allegedly wrongful actions, but that no more
precludes a conflict-of-laws analysis here than it did there." Hartford Fire, 113 S. Ct. at
2922 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
47. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 581-82.
48. Id. at 582-93 (setting forth and applying "several factors which, alone or in
combination, are generally conceded to influence choice of law to govern a tort claim." Id.
at 583.).
49. Id. at 592-93.
50. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
51. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18,1970,23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 241 [hereinafter
Hague Evidence Convention].
52. Agrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544.
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any special problem confronted by the foreign litigant on account
of its nationality or the location of its operations, and for any sov-
ereign interest expressed by a foreign state. '5 3 Thus, in its previous
rulings on international comity, the Court has utilized comity to
balance competing interests of the United States and other foreign
nations and has not limited its inquiry to a showing of an actual
conflict between domestic and foreign law. As Justice Scalia
argued in his dissent in Hartford Fire, the Court's "true conflict"
approach is a "breathtakingly broad proposition, which contradicts
the many cases discussed earlier, [and] will bring the Sherman Act
and other laws into sharp and unnecessary conflict with the legiti-
mate interests of other countries. ' 4
Finally, given that the Court found no conflict to exist, Hartford
Fire provides no guidance as to whether courts should utilize a bal-
ancing approach in instances of "truly" conflicting domestic and
foreign laws. Though Hartford Fire is not instructive, Lauritzen
and Agrospatiale suggest that lower courts should evaluate the
interests of the foreign state and the United States, consider all
relevant factors, and defer to the other state if that state's interest
is greater.55 Moreover, in determining preference between con-
flicting exercises of jurisdiction, preference will likely be given to
the state where the allegedly unlawful act was done, because a
53. Id.; see also Born, supra note 8, at 49 (stating that under Airospatiale, courts must
"balance 'the respective [sovereign] interests of the foreign nation and the requesting
nation,' hardship suffered by private parties, the need for the requested materials and
other factors").
The nature of the concerns that guide a comity analysis is suggested by the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States .... While we
recognize that § 437 of the Restatement may not represent a consensus of
international views on the scope of the district court's power to order foreign
discovery in the face of objections by foreign states, these factors are relevant to
any comity analysis: (1) the importance to the ... litigation of the documents or
other information requested; (2) the degree of specificity of the request; (3)
whether the information originated in the United States; (4) the availability of
alternative means of securing the information; and (5) the extent to which
noncompliance with the request would undermine important interests of the
United States, or compliance with the request would undermine important
interests of the state where the information is located.
Arospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28.
54. Hartford Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2922 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. See Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 582-93; Afrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 543-46; see also
Restatement (Third), supra note 12, § 403(3) (providing that when "the prescriptions by




state should not prohibit a person to do abroad what the territorial
state requires.
5 6
In conclusion, by holding that international comity is not rele-
vant except in instances of an actual conflict, Hartford Fire
portends the return of an era reminiscent of the early days of
Alcoa-bringing "the Sherman Act and other laws into sharp and
unnecessary conflict with the legitimate interests of other coun-
tries."s Provided there is a sufficiently close nexus with the
United States to justify the assertion of jurisdiction, Hartford Fire
evidences little concern for, or consideration of, the fundamental
sovereignty interests of another country that may have concurrent
jurisdiction. Thus, what may be called a "comity-as-conflict"
approach ensures unnecessary conflict, and may once again evoke
the charge of "Yankee 'jurisdictional jingoism.' "
5 8
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALysis
One of the primary theses of the previous article was that the
United States and European Union approaches to the extraterrito-
rial application of antitrust laws are increasingly developing along
parallel lines. As a general proposition the United States, prior to
Hartford Fire, proclaimed a broad grant of jurisdictional authority
over extraterritorial activities under the effects doctrine, but cur-
tailed that authority through comity-based limitations. The Euro-
pean Court of Justice, under the "implementation approach"
announced in Ahlstrom v. Commission ("Wood Pulp"), 9 asserted
jurisdiction on the basis of objective territoriality, inquiring as to
where the allegedly unlawful agreement was implemented and
interpreting quite broadly what constituted a consummating act
within the Union.60 Thus, I argued that
56. Restatement (Third), supra note 12, § 441 Cmt. a says that "a state may not, absent
unusual circumstances, require a person, even one of its nationals, to do abroad what the
territorial state prohibits." This is known as the "foreign sovereign compulsion" doctrine.
See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (finding that for one
jurisdiction to treat a private party of another jurisdiction as if it were on of its own, "not
only would be unjust, but would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign,
contrary to the comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent").
57. Hartford Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2922 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58. See John B. Sandage, Forum Non Conveniens and the Extraterritorial Application of
United States Antitrust Law, 94 Yale LJ. 1693, 1698 (1985).
59. Case 89185, Ahlstrbm v. Comm'n, 1988 E.C.R. 519, 4 C.M.LR. 901 (1988)
[hereinafter Wood Pulp]; see also Alford, supra note 1, at 31-37 (describing and analyzing
the Wood Pulp decision).
60. The Wood Pulp court explained:
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The effects doctrine is continually being narrowed and
qualified to require a showing of stronger jurisdictional
nexus through direct, substantial, and reasonably foresee-
able effects, while the objective territoriality approach is
being reformulated and expanded to encompass certain
activities that would fall well outside its traditional ambit.
The result is a convergence of application of [E.U.] and
U.S. antitrust laws vis-A-vis foreign defendants.
'61
Hartford Fire nearly completes this convergence in matters of
comity: juxtaposed, Hartford Fire and Wood Pulp present a striking
similarity in their approach to international comity in the extrater-
ritorial application of antitrust laws. Wood Pulp concluded that a
requirement of comity would "amount [t]o calling in question the
[Union's] jurisdiction to apply its competition rules ... and...
[that] that argument has already been rejected." 62 As to the
defendants' argument that the Union should exercise its jurisdic-
tion with moderation where persons are subject to contradictory
state commands, Wood Pulp deferred inquiry, since the occasion
for considering such a rule was not present. "There is not, in this
case, any contradiction between the conduct required by the
United States and that required by the [Union] since the Webb-
Pomerene Act merely exempts the conclusion of export cartels
from the application of United States anti-trust laws but does not
require such cartels to be concluded." 63
Thus, under both approaches, a "true conflict" exists only when
there are mutually exclusive state obligations that make compli-
ance with both impossible. In Wood Pulp the Court of Justice
ruled that no conflict existed because the Webb-Pomerene Act,64
which exempts export cartels from the application of United States
The decisive factor is . . . the place where [the agreement to fix prices] is
implemented.
The producers in this case implemented their pricing agreement within the
common market. It is immaterial in that respect whether or not they had
recourse to subsidiaries, agents, sub-agents, or branches within the Community in
order to make their contacts with purchasers within the Community.
Id. at 5243; see also Alford, supra note 1, at 37-38 (stating that, although the European
Court believes that the territoriality principle is the best way to assert jurisdiction over
foreign "antitrust" defendants, Wood Pulp represents the Court's abandonment of a strict
definition of "territoriality" in favor of an objective territorial approach reinterpreted in
light of the goal of controlling foreign anticompetitive practices).
61. Alford, supra note 1, at 40.
62. Wood Pulp, 1988 E.C.R. at 5244.
63. Id.
64. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1988).
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antitrust laws, does not "require such cartels to be concluded" in
violation of E.U. competition laws.6 Similarly, the Supreme Court
held in Hartford Fire that the British Restrictive Trade Practice
(Services) Order, which exempts certain insurance services from
the application of British antitrust laws, does not "require[] them
to act in some fashion prohibited by the law of the United
States. 66 Thus, under Wood Pulp and Hartford Fire, international
comity is roughly coextensive with the doctrine of foreign sover-
eign compulsion.67
Because under both Hartford Fire and Wood Pulp the only possi-
ble bar to jurisdiction over a foreign antitrust defendant occurs
when the defendant is subjected to conflicting laws, other foreign
sovereignty concerns, no matter how profound or persuasive,
become irrelevant. This symmetry, at one level, should minimize
conflict between the United States and the European Union as to
the regard properly accorded by courts to the interests of a foreign
sovereign. Neither the United States nor the European Union, in
adopting analogously restrictive comity approaches, can complain
when its laws and policies are not given greater deference. But if
this convergence renders a certain theoretical consistency, or
reduces conflict by force of functional similarity and a common
attitude, it will do so only at the expense of adequate solicitude to
the principle of international comity.
The narrow definition of a conflict of laws adduced in Wood
Pulp and Hartford Fire ensures that comity will almost never be a
factor in the extraterritorial application of antitrust laws; in the vast
majority of antitrust cases, the conflict is between one state encour-
aging or permitting certain behavior and another state prohibiting
that same behavior. For example, many countries, including the
United States, exempt anticompetitive export cartels from domes-
tic antitrust laws in order to encourage increasing market shares
worldwide.'e Governments may encourage cooperation among
65. Wood Pulp, 1988 E.C.R. at 5244 (emphasis added).
66. Hartford Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2911.
67. See Restatement (Third), supra note 12, § 441 cmt. a. Under § 403(3), when two
states have jurisdiction to prescribe contradictory commands, certain principles of
preference generally prevail. Section 441 on foreign state compulsion applies the
principles of section 403(3) "to protect persons caught between such conflicting
commands." Id.
68. Pettit & Styles, supra note 9, at 699 (lsting the United States, the United Kingdom.
Canada, Germany, Japan, and Australia); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1988) (codification
of the Webb-Pomerene Act, the pertinent U.S. law).
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competitors to set prices for certain precious commodities,69 or
even direct competitors to implement government trading policies
under threat of sanction.70 Under the "true conflict" approach,
however, courts must ignore competing or inconsistent regulatory
policies exempting, encouraging, or guiding specific behavior. In
short, if comity becomes a consideration only when one state pro-
hibits what another state affirmatively requires, comity as a check
on the extraterritorial application of antitrust laws will rarely be a
factor. Given that both jurisdictions have eschewed a balancing
approach, it is increasingly likely that the practical result under
both approaches will be the same: courts will assert jurisdiction
over foreign defendants.
Finally, the narrow definition of international comity is in ten-
sion with the U.S.-E.U. competition laws co-operation agreement
("Co-operation Agreement").71 On the one hand, both the
Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice have disavowed
any notion of comity save in instances of foreign sovereign compul-
sion; on the other hand, the European Commission and the Justice
Department have adopted, with great ceremony, the Co-operation
Agreement, with its explicit incorporation of a comity analysis
when either party's enforcement activities adversely affect the
other party's sovereign interests.72 Under article VI of the Co-
operation Agreement, "each Party will seek, at all stages in its
enforcement activities, to take into account the important interests
of the other Party. Each Party shall consider important interests of
the other Party in decisions as to whether or not to initiate an
69. Cf. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1254 (7th Cir. 1980) (foreign
governments were "actively and admittedly sympathetic to the economic determinism" of
defendant foreign uranium producers); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753,
890 (D.N.J. 1949) ("[T]he industrial climate of Europe was that of cartelized operation
often with government participation."); John H. Shenefield, Thoughts on Extraterritorial
Application of the United States Antitrust Laws, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 350, 354 (1983)
(noting that the United States' preference for vigorous competition collides with foreign
"regulatory regimes").
70. See In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 310, 315 (3d Cir. 1983)
(rejecting sovereign compulsion defense of Japanese companies and their subsidiaries
despite diplomatic note confirming that the challenged conduct was taken pursuant to
Japanese trading policy and at the direction of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade
and Industry ("MITI")), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
71. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of their
Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1487 [hereinafter Co-operation Agreement].
72. See Alford, supra note 1, at 44-49.
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investigation or proceeding."73 The Co-operation Agreement then
sets forth several factors to be considered in the comity analysis-
precisely the same factors used under the U.S. jurisdictional rule of
reason.74 For government-initiated enforcement proceedings, then,
there is careful consideration of international comity concerns; for
private-party actions, by contrast, the balancing of foreign sover-
eignty interests has been sharply curtailed by the Supreme Court's
ruling in Hartford Fire.
V. CONCLUSION
For now, Hartford Fire has largely settled the nettlesome ques-
tion of how much deference U.S. courts should give to the legiti-
mate foreign sovereignty interests of other nations when applying
U.S. antitrust laws extraterritorially. It has ensured that the fate of
extraterritorial infringements will not be different from the fate of
wholly internal infringements, except in the rare instance where a
foreign defendant is subjected to an actual conflict between foreign
and domestic state commands. Thus, far from being a lasting fix-
ture on the legal landscape, the jurisdictional rule of reason has
now been repudiated, or at least reduced to the simple question of
whether" 'there is in fact a true conflict between domestic and for-
eign law.' ",-' Only then, if at all, will courts undertake a comity
analysis balancing the foreign sovereignty interests.
Because the Hartford Fire approach to international comity is
essentially the same as that reached by the Court of Justice in
Wood Pulp, there is now, more than ever, a convergence in the
application of E.U. and U.S. antitrust laws vis-,-vis foreign defend-
ants. That is, in the vast majority of cases, the same conduct will
result in the exercise of jurisdiction whether analyzed under Wood
Pulp's implementation approach or Hartford Fire's effects doc-
trine. Nevertheless, it is regrettable that neither jurisdiction has
established a flexible approach to the extraterritorial application of
antitrust laws so that courts might avoid, in the interest of interna-
tional comity, undue encroachments on the foreign sovereignty
interests of other nations.
73. Co-operation Agreement, supra note 71, art. VL
74. Examples of these factors include, among others, the degree of conflict with foreign
law, the nationalities of the parties, and the relative importance of the alleged violation in
the United States as compared to abroad. See id.; Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1976); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595
F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979); Restatement (Third), supra note 12, § 403(2).
75. Hartford Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2910.
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One possible solution would be for Congress to amend the Sher-
man Act to incorporate a jurisdictional rule of reason. Congress
has, in recent years, introduced several initiatives incorporating a
comity-based balancing approach when applying antitrust laws
extraterritorially; they have met with little success. 76 Nevertheless,
the confluence of a Supreme Court decision insensitive to interna-
tional comity concerns and the adoption of the Co-operation
Agreement specifically incorporating a balancing approach may
suggest that the time is ripe for a statutory jurisdictional rule of
reason.
77
A solution might also be found in recent initiatives to codify, in a
multilateral convention, the extraterritorial reach of antitrust laws
in light of international comity considerations. The many endeav-
ors to harmonize antitrust laws suggest at least that Hartford Fire
and Wood Pulp are swimming against a rising tide of cooperation
in international antitrust enforcement.78 Such cooperation may
76. See, e.g., S. 50, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 572, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S.
397, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); see also Eleanor M. Fox, Extraterritoriality and
Antitrust-Is "Reasonableness" the Answer?, 1986 Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 49, 75-81
(1987). Under S. 397, in any action involving trade with a foreign nation, the court shall
dismiss the case
whenever it determines that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable
primarily on the basis of the following factors: (1) the relative significance, to the
violation alleged, of conduct within the United States as compared to conduct
abroad; (2) the nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the conduct;
(3) the presence or absence of a purpose to affect United States consumers or
competitors; (4) the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the
conduct on the United States as compared with the effects abroad; (5) the
existence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered or defeated by the
action; and (6) the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign
economic policies.
S. 397, supra. S. 397 passed the Judiciary Committee but failed to reach the floor of the
Senate during the 99th Congress. Both the American Bar Association and the Justice
Department have expressed support for a statutory jurisdictional rule of reason. Fox,
supra, at 77, 79.
77. Such legislation could mirror article VI of the Co-operation Agreement. See Co-
operation Agreement, supra note 71, art. VI; Alford, supra note 1, at 48.
78. A number of bilateral agreements have endorsed an approach incorporating a rule
of reason in the extraterritorial application of antitrust laws. See Co-operation
Agreement, supra note 71, art. VI; Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification,
Consultation and Cooperation with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws,
Mar. 9, 1984, U.S.-Can., 23 I.L.M. 275,278-79 (1984); Agreement Relating to Cooperation
on Antitrust Matters, June 29,1982, U.S.-Aust., 34 U.S.T. 389,392-93; Agreement Relating
to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June 23, 1976, U.S.-
F.R.G., 27 U.S.T. 1956, 1958-59 (entered into force Sept. 11, 1976). As for a multilateral
convention on international antitrust enforcement and the need for interest balancing
when applying antitrust laws extraterritorially, see Int'l Antitrust Code Working Group,
Draft International Antitrust Code as a GATr-MTO-Plurilateral Trade Agreement (July
PosTscRrPT
now be needed, for, as Judge Fitzmaurice admonished in Barcelona
Traction, international law obligates every state to "exercise mod-
eration and restraint as to the extent of [its] jurisdiction[,]" so as to
"avoid undue encroachment on a jurisdiction more properly apper-
taining to... another State.
'79
10,1993), reprinted in 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) (Spec. Supp. 1993); Am. Bar
Ass'n, Report of the Special Committee on International Antitrust: A World Antitrust
Code (1991); Inst. of Int'l Law, Nineteenth Commission on the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
of States, Revised Draft Resolution, art. 4 (1990), reprinted in 65 Y.B. Inst. Int'l L 148,149
(1993) (-[E]xtraterritorial jurisdiction ...shall be exercised with due regard to the
principles of reasonableness and non-interference with the internal affairs of other States.
Reasonableness consists, inter alia, in the balancing of interests of the States concerned."):
1986 Recommendations of the Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD") Concerning Cooperation between Members and Countries on
Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade, OECD Doc. C(86) 44 (1986),
reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1629 (1986).
79. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.CJ. 4, 105
(Fitzmaurice, J., separate opinion).
1993]

